THE geography of power in world politics is never permanent. The states that once occupied the margins of international decision-making can, with the accumulation of economic, political and diplomatic weight, gradually move closer to the centre. The rise of BRICS should be understood within this broad transformation. It is not merely a platform for cooperation among emerging economies. It is also an expression of growing dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution of power, representation and influence in the contemporary international system.

The name BRICS originally derived from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Over time, however, the grouping has expanded significantly and now includes a wider range of major states from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. This expansion is important because it signals that BRICS is no longer simply a compact among five large emerging economies. It is increasingly becoming a political and economic platform through which countries of the global south seek greater voice in shaping the rules of the international order.

Why BRICS matters?

MANY of the principal institutions governing the international political and economic system were created after World War II, at a time when many of today’s emerging powers possessed far less economic and diplomatic influence than they do now. That balance has changed considerably.

China and India have become major global economic powers. Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and others now exercise growing influence within their respective regions and beyond. This inevitably raises a fundamental question: if the distribution of economic power in the world has changed, why should the architecture of international decision-making remain largely unchanged?

BRICS enters precisely at this point of tension. One of its central ambitions is to promote a more representative and multipolar international order. It seeks greater influence for developing countries in global financial and political institutions, stronger cooperation among member states, greater access to development finance, expansion of trade and investment, wider use of national currencies in cross-border transactions, and greater coordination on issues ranging from energy and infrastructure to development and global governance.

One of its most tangible institutional achievements has been the creation of the New Development Bank. The development bank supports infrastructure and sustainable development projects in areas such as transport, energy, water, urban development and environmental protection. Its importance lies not in replacing established international financial institutions but in widening the range of development-financing options available to emerging and developing economies.

Regional organisations challenged?

STRICTLY speaking, BRICS is not a regional organisation. Its members are geographically dispersed across several continents. It does not, therefore, directly compete with organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation or the African Union.

Its greater significance lies elsewhere. BRICS potentially challenges the dominance of international structures in which Western powers have historically exercised disproportionate influence. Yet it would be misleading to describe BRICS simply as an anti-Western alliance. Its members do not share identical strategic orientations.

India, for example, is a central member of BRICS while simultaneously maintaining close strategic relations with the United States, Japan and Australia. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continue to maintain deep security and economic ties with Western countries. Other members likewise pursue highly diversified foreign policies.

The significance of BRICS, therefore, lies less in replacing the West than in creating alternative spaces for negotiation, financing and political coordination. It enlarges the diplomatic room for manoeuvre available to states that do not wish to depend excessively on a single power centre.

What could Bangladesh gain?

FOR Bangladesh, the significance of BRICS is multidimensional. First, Bangladesh will continue to require substantial financing for infrastructure, energy, transport, urbanisation and development as it moves into a more advanced stage of economic transformation. Bangladesh has already joined the New Development Bank, which provides a concrete institutional link to the BRICS framework. Greater engagement could therefore widen Bangladesh’s access to development finance and reduce excessive dependence on any single financial source.

Second, BRICS could help diversify Bangladesh’s economic diplomacy. China and India are already among Bangladesh’s most important economic partners. At the same time, Middle Eastern members of BRICS are critically important for energy security, labour migration, remittances and investment. Countries such as Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia also offer considerable potential for trade expansion and new commercial partnerships.

Third, as Bangladesh graduates from the category of least developed countries, it will gradually face the erosion of some of the preferential advantages associated with that status. It will therefore need to seek new markets, new sources of investment and new forms of development cooperation. BRICS could serve as one additional platform through which Bangladesh can manage that transition.

Fourth, closer engagement with BRICS could strengthen Bangladesh’s broader tradition of diversified diplomacy. For a small or middle power, strategic success does not necessarily come from attaching itself to one bloc. It often comes from cultivating relationships across competing centres of power while preserving freedom of action.

The opportunities are substantial, but so are the diplomatic complications. Bangladesh’s first challenge is one of strategic balance. Europe and North America remain critically important to Bangladesh’s exports, development partnerships and financial relationships. At the same time, China, India, Japan, the Gulf states and other Asian partners are deeply embedded in Bangladesh’s economy and strategic environment.

If participation in BRICS were interpreted as a geopolitical tilt towards one camp, Bangladesh could face unnecessary diplomatic costs. The country would therefore need to frame any deeper engagement not as bloc politics, but as economic diversification and strategic autonomy.

The second challenge lies within BRICS itself. Its members do not always share common interests. China and India are strategic competitors. Russia is in deep confrontation with major Western powers. Iran has its own security priorities, while Gulf states pursue distinct regional agendas.

This diversity gives BRICS breadth, but it also limits cohesion. Bangladesh would therefore need to assess not only the symbolic value of membership, but also the practical capacity of the grouping to deliver tangible benefits.

Third, membership in any international grouping is not, by itself, a guarantee of economic gain. Investment does not automatically increase because a country joins a forum. Trade does not expand without planning. Development finance cannot be absorbed effectively without strong institutions and bankable projects.

Bangladesh would therefore need a clearly defined national strategy: which sectors should receive priority, which markets should be targeted, what financing should be sought, and how BRICS engagement would complement rather than complicate existing external partnerships.

The most important question for Bangladesh is not merely whether it should become a full member of BRICS. The more consequential question is: how can Bangladesh use BRICS to advance its national interests?

Membership in an international grouping is not an ornament. It is an instrument. If Bangladesh were to seek membership simply to acquire another diplomatic label, the value would be limited. But if greater engagement could generate access to infrastructure finance, new markets, investment, energy partnerships, technology cooperation and a stronger voice in the Global South, then the strategic value could be considerable.

The world is becoming increasingly multipolar. Power is diffusing. New centres of influence are emerging alongside older ones. In such a world, Bangladesh does not necessarily need to choose one camp against another. It needs to increase the value of its own position. That is where BRICS may matter most.

Bangladesh’s diplomatic success will depend on its ability to deepen relations with Beijing without losing Washington, cooperate with New Delhi without surrendering strategic autonomy, work with Moscow without undermining access to European markets, and engage BRICS without allowing itself to be perceived as an appendage of any geopolitical bloc.

For small and middle powers, influence does not derive from military capability alone. It often comes from something more subtle: the ability to remain strategically autonomous while becoming valuable to multiple partners at the same time.

BRICS can offer Bangladesh one pathway towards that objective provided it is treated not as an ideological destination, but as a diplomatic and economic instrument for advancing the national interest.

Dr AKM Ahsan Ullah is a professor of international relations, security and migration at the Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Brunei.