WHEN more than 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh in the last quarter of 2017, the world witnessed a humanitarian crisis of an unprecedented scale in Southeast Asia. The UN human rights chief described it as ‘a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.’ The UN secretary general called the situation ‘catastrophic.’ The French president described it as ‘a genocide.’ The US vice-president called Myanmar’s actions ‘terrible savagery.’ Yet, a decade later, Rohingyas, the stateless, forgotten and embittered race of the mankind, languish in camps in Bangladesh. The international response has been a study in failure and Bangladesh’s performance, despite bearing the heaviest burden, has been marked by strategic miscalculations.

Great power game

CHINA and Russia have been the most consequential obstacles to international action. They both called Myanmar’s atrocity crimes ‘internal affairs.’ They opposed resolutions against Myanmar in the UN Security Council in 2017. When Britain and France drafted a resolution calling on Myanmar to ‘immediately cease military operations’ and allow refugees to return, China strongly opposed it. A UNSC diplomat said that the Chinese were not on board and wanted them ‘to say nothing and do nothing on this issue.’

In November 2018, Britain drafted another resolution with a timeline for refugee return and a warning that the Security Council could consider further steps, including sanctions. Both Russia and China rebuffed it. The Russian UN ambassador called the draft resolution ‘inappropriate, untimely and useless.’ China boycotted all discussions and defined Myanmar’s genocidal crimes as ‘a legitimate counter-insurgency operation.’

Both Chinese and Russian policies towards Myanmar are motivated by strategic and economic interests. Russia has military trade interests. It is the largest source of Myanmar air force inventory. Four months after the genocidal crimes, Myanmar placed a purchase order for six Su-30SME military aircraft at $210 million, along with Orlan-10E UAV and Pantsir S-1 missile systems. After the 2021 coup, Russia secured the sale of undisclosed quantities of Ka-27/28 anti-submarine helicopters and precision-guided munitions.

China has classified geostrategic, economic and military trade interests in Myanmar. Military regimes have received China’s consistent protection. China has its ‘second coast’ in Myanmar, providing a quick access to the Indian Ocean through the Bay of Bengal, reducing dependence on the Malacca Strait.

India’s calculated silence

INDIA, a geopolitical actor in the region, remained silent. Its support was limited to only a plane load of rice for the refugees. In resonance with the Myanmar regime, India announced plans in September 2017 to deport Rohingya refugees living in Indian states. On October 4, 2018, India handed over seven Rohingya men to Myanmar authorities at the border town of Moreh in Manipur state after ‘reconfirming their willingness to be repatriated, a move Human Rights Watch called ‘forced return.’ On April 8, 2021, the Indian Supreme Court cleared the deportation of 176 more Rohingyas.

India has geostrategic interests in Myanmar and competes with China. Driven by its act-east policy, counter-insurgency concerns in its northeast and competition with China, India views the Myanmar government as a critical partner. It has provided military aid for the Tatmadaw. It avoided supporting Bangladesh’s call for the repatriation of the Rohingyas to keep Nay Pyi Taw in confidence.

ASEAN paralysis

THE Association of Southeast Asian Nations, caught by its ‘principles of non-interference’ dilemma, failed to respond to the crisis perpetrated by one of its member states. During the 31st Summit held in November 10–14, 2017, the regional bloc did not respond because of the leadership failure to grasp the gravity of the situation. The Philippines president, chair of the summit, was a maverick on the refugee crisis. He said on January 6, 2018 that ‘genocide was taking place in Myanmar’ then apologised to Aung San Suu Kyi for his ‘genocide remark.’

ASEAN’s ‘five-point consensus’ on Myanmar, agreed on after the 2021 coup, has been openly ignored by the junta. The inability to take collective, decisive action has exposed ASEAN’s organisational pitfall.

ICJ: silver line

THE republic of the Gambia, with support from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, filed a lawsuit against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice in November 2019. On January 23, 2020, the court ordered provisional measures that ‘Myanmar must take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of genocide against Rohingya.’

On July 22, 2022, the ICJ rejected Myanmar’s objections on the court’s jurisdiction and ruled to proceed with the Rohingya genocide trial. Public hearings on the merit of the case were held in January 12–29, 2026. Eleven states intervened in the case. During the hearings, the ICJ heard allegations that military officials had incited violence through hate speech, calling the ethnic minority in derogatory terms who should be made ‘extinct.’ Myanmar rejected the allegations, telling the court that the Gambia’s case rests on ‘unsubstantiated allegations.’

However, the final judgement could take years and the most important question remains: ‘If the Gambia gets a favourable verdict, what will be the international community’s response to implementing the judgment?’

Bangladesh’s pitfalls

WHILE bearing the immense economic and environment burden resulting form the catastrophe, Bangladesh’s handling of the crisis has been marked by several strategic missteps. Initially, Dhaka’s primary focus was on emergency management and relying heavily on the goodwill of powers like China to mediate with Myanmar. This approach failed to account for the fundamentally transactional nature of the mediators’ interests.

A critical error was Dhaka’s early reluctance to internationalise the issue robustly, fearing it would antagonise Myanmar and China and complicate repatriation talks. This allowed the narrative to be framed as a bilateral or trilateral issue, precisely as China desired, insulating the Myanmar junta from the full weight of multilateral pressure.

Two subsequent actions severely damaged repatriation prospects. First, Bangladesh’s relocation of refugees to the Bhasan Char island was strategically misinterpreted by the junta as evidence that Bangladesh was preparing for long-term integration of the Rohingyas into its own population. Second, the Arakan Army’s successful takeover of Rakhine State altered the reality on the ground. The junta with which Bangladesh negotiated is no longer the sovereign authority in Rakhine.

Bangladesh failed to analyse military junta’s intention after the Kofi Annan Commission’s report and also failed to understand the purpose of Myanmar’s military buildup in northern Rakhine in June–July 2017. While the army was bringing in extra forces, the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw were holding an unofficial ceasefire. Warring parties normally do not move personnel or war material while a truce is in force. Extra forces were brought in to conduct a planned Clearance Operation to evict the Rohingyas.

Another blunder was not creating leadership within the Rohingya community. They needed a leader to keep them organised for resettling in their homes in Myanmar.

Unfolding humanitarian catastrophe

TODAY, more than 1.2 million Rohingya refugees live across 33 congested camps in the world’s largest refugee settlement in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char. New arrivals continue in bits and pieces as conflict, insecurity and violence escalate in Rakhine. The Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees recorded 150,000 new arrivals in 2025.

The 2025–2026 joint response plan requires $934.5 million to reach 1.2 million people, but it has only received 35 per cent of the funding. Life in the camps remains bleak and overcrowded and fragile settlements face constant threats from extreme weather, disease, and insecurity. More than 235,000 Rohingya children remain without access to formal education. An MSF survey found that 84 per cent of the Rohingya refugees do not feel safe returning to Myanmar.

The tenth year of the exodus finds the Rohingyas no closer to justice or return. The world watched in 2017. A decade later, the world continues to watch and do far too little.

To be continued.

Mohammad Abdur Razzak ([email protected]), a retired commodore of the Bangladesh navy, is a geopolitical analyst.